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Keywords: subjective probability, moral hazard, state-dependent preferences.
JEL classiﬁcations: D81, D82
Simon Grant
CentER Fellow









email: karni@jhunix.hcf.jhu.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Subjective expected utility theory is founded on the tacit notion that choice among alternative
courses of action (acts) is governed by two separate cognitive processes: the assessment of the
likelihood of various events, or the formation of beliefs, and the valuation of the consequences
associated with those events. Moreover, beliefs are supposed to be coherent enough to allow
their representation by a (subjective) probability measure, and the valuation of the consequences
suﬃciently structured to permit their representation by numerical utilities. Individual preferences
on acts are represented by the expected values of the utilities of the consequences of these acts
with respect to the subjective probability measure.
Choice-theoretic models of subjective expected utility, including Savage (1954) and Anscombe
and Aumann (1963), derive the subjective probabilities and utilities from individuals’ preference
relations on the set of acts. These, and all similarly conceived, models give rise to equivalent
representations of preferences each involving a utility function and a corresponding subjective
probability measure. To determine a unique subjective probability the choice-theoretic models
invoke the convention, not implied by the axioms, that the utility function is state independent.
Put diﬀerently, the axiomatic structures of the various choice-theoretic subjective expected utility
models require that the preference relations on acts be state independent (for example, Savage’s
postulate P3 and P4, and Anscombe and Aumann state-independence axiom) but that does not
imply that the utility function must be state-independent. In fact, state-independent preferences
only require that the utility function representing the valuation of the consequences in diﬀerent
states be aﬃne transformations of one another. Thus the normalization of the utility functions
to make them the same across states has no theoretical foundation. Moreover, the subjective
probabilities are the normalized multiplicative coeﬃcients of these utility functions. Hence these
subjective probabilities are inherently arbitrary (see Schervish, Seidenfeld, and Kadane [1990];
Karni and Schmeidler [1993]; and Karni [1996]). In particular, it is possible that a decision
maker’s preference relation on acts satisfy the axioms of subjective expected utility theory and yet
be ascribed probabilities that do not represent his beliefs and utilities that do not represent his
valuations.
1To remedy this problem and obtain a deﬁnition of subjective probability that quantiﬁes the
decision-makers’ beliefs it is necessary to extend the choice space. One possible extension, due to
Karni and Schmeidler (1981), calls for the introduction of a second preference relation over hypo-
thetical lotteries on the set of state-consequence pairs. The new preference relation is linked ax-
iomatically to the preference relation on horse/roulette-lotteries acts in the framework of Anscombe
and Aumann (1963). The original intent of Karni and Schmeidler was to model subjective ex-
pected utility theory with state-dependent preferences, however, Karni and Mongin (2000) recently
noted that the probabilities thus obtained are, in fact, the unique correct representation of deci-
sion makers’ beliefs. The model of Karni and Schmeidler, as well as the more general expected
utility model explored in Karni (2001) and the nonexpected utility theory developed in Grant and
Karni (2000), in all of which the subjective probabilities represent of decision-makers’ beliefs, rely
on the use of objective probabilities on the set of states as a primitive concept. More recently,
Karni (2002) developed an axiomatic subjective expected utility model with preferences deﬁned
on conditional acts (or, alternatively, preference over actions that delimit the events that might
o b t a i n )t h a tl e a d st oad e ﬁnition of subjective probabilities representing decision makers’ beliefs,
and utilities that represent their valuations. Like Savage (1954), Karni’s theory does not involve
the use of objective probabilities as a primitive concept but, unlike Savage, it accommodates
state-dependent preferences.
These developments raises the question: other than for philosophical reasons, why is it impor-
tant to represent decision makers’ of beliefs and valuations correctly? Karni (1996) argued that
such a representation is desirable since it renders the decision-makers’ observed choice behavior
and their verbal exchange of information consistent. Karni (2002) showed, in the context of a sim-
ple principal-agent problem, that if the principal ascribes to the agent probabilities, implied by
the choice-theoretic subjective expected utility model, that misrepresent the agent’s beliefs, and
designs an incentive-contract based on these probabilities, the principal runs the risk of inducing
the agent to choose an action that is not in the principal’s best interest.
Our purpose, in this paper, is to explore this issue further. In particular, we intend to examine
the role of ascribing the agent the correct utility function. To do this we show that if the principal
2ascribes incorrect utilities and/or subjective probabilities to the agent, he may fail to induce the
agent to act in a way that serves the best interest of the principal. In other words, we show that
a contract designed, on the basis of ascribed probabilities and utilities implied by choice-theoretic
subjective expected utility model, to motivate the agent to choose one action motivates him,
instead, to choose another action that is less desirable for the principal.
2 The Envious Agent Problem
In classical economic theory self-interest seeking behavior is portrayed strictly as a quest to im-
prove the individual’s material well-being. This narrow view of human nature has recently been
challenged and the possibility of incorporating emotions into the theory of choice is explored (see,
for example, a survey by Elster [1998] and discussions by Loewenstein [2000], Romer [2000]). The
interest in broadening the psychological basis underlaying the conduct of economic agents is due,
in part, to experimental evidence indicating a tendency of individuals to cooperate in situations
in which maximization of material self-interest alone would imply non-cooperative behavior (see
Camerer [1997], Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe [1995]). Against this backdrop, we consider next a
principal-agent relation that may be inﬂuenced by envy. Speciﬁcally, we analyze a principal-agent
problem in which the agent’s preferences incorporate envy, and yet are representable by a sub-
jective expected utility functional. In other words, the agent’s choice behavior is consistent with
the principal ascribing to him subjective probabilities and utilities implied by the choice-theoretic
expected utility model. We show that the failure of the principal to detect the presence of envy
results in a contract, based on the principal’s ascribed utilities and probabilities, that motivates
the agent to act in a way that is not in the principal’s best interest.
2.1 An advertising campaign
Consider the following principal-agent problem. A producer (the principal) engages an advertising
agency to promote an event (e.g., a rock concert). The revenue is a random variable that depends
on the state of nature which, in this instance, represents the state of demand and on the advertising
3campaign. Speciﬁcally, suppose that there are three states of nature S = {L,M,H}, where L
signiﬁes low demand, M signiﬁes moderate demand, and H signiﬁes high demand. The agent
must choose between an advertising campaign, an, that would reach a narrow potential audience,
a n da na d v e r t i s i n gc a m p a i g n ,a`, that would reach a wide potential audience. Assume that if he
chooses an then, if the demand is high the producer will sell the concert-hall capacity and attain
the high level of revenue, rH, if the demand is moderate he will sell half of the concert-hall capacity
and attain a revenue of rM, and if the demand is low he will sell only 15 percent of the concert-hall
capacity and attain low revenue level, rL. If the agent chooses an advertising campaign to reach
a wide audience, namely, a`, he can boost the demand to the point of ensuring himself of selling
at least half of the concert-hall capacity. In other words, he can prevent the situation in which
only 15 percent of the capacity is sold, and will either sell half the concert-hall capacity or the
entire concert-hall capacity. Assume that the nature of the advertising campaign (eﬀort and cost
invested to reach the potential audience) is private information of the agent.
To model the situation described above let B ={a`,a n} denote the set of feasible actions. The
eﬀects of the alternative advertising campaigns are expressed by the mapping F : B → E,w h e r eE




= {M,H} and an corresponds to the universal event F (an)={L,M,H}. Note
that, once the agent chooses an action, say a ∈ B, the elements of the set F (a) correspond to
Savage’s deﬁnition of the state of the world (nature), namely, “a description of the world, leaving
no relevant aspect undescribed,” (Savage 1954, p. 9) since, given a, the state of demand alone
determines the revenue, which is the only relevant aspect of nature. The fact that the set of states
depends on the action means that our framework is that of preferences on conditional acts (see
Luce and Krantz [1971], Fishburn [1973], and the adaptation in Karni [2002]).
Assume that both the principal and the agent are expected utility-maximizing Bayesian deci-
sion makers whose preferences are state independent. This terminology merits some elaboration.
First, a subjective expected utility maximizing decision maker is Bayesian if he updates his prior
subjective probabilities using Bayes rule. While the choice-theoretic subjective expected utility
model does not imply this particular updating rule, it is, nevertheless, consistent with it. Sub-
4jective expected utility models in which Bayesian updating is implied require the extension of
the analytical framework. For example, Ghirartato (2002) uses conditional preferences on acts
and Karni (2002) uses preferences on conditional acts to obtain subjective expected utility rep-
resentations of Bayesian decision makers’ preferences. Second, as noted above, the framework
that we use is that of preferences on conditional acts. This means that for every a ∈ B, the set
of states is F (a), and the corresponding (conditional) acts are functions from F (a) to the set
of consequences. A decision maker is a subjective expected utility maximizer if his preferences
on conditional acts are representable by a subjective expected utility functional. The axiomatic
foundations of subjective expected utility theory of Bayesian decision making, which is the theory
used here, is developed in Karni (2002).
Suppose that both the principal and the agent believe that if the narrow advertising campaign
is launched then the three states are equally likely to obtain, but these beliefs are not common
knowledge. In other words, the beliefs of both parties are represented by the uniform probability
distribution πH = πM = πL, where πs denotes the subjective probability of state s ∈ S, but the
principal does not know this and must infer the agent’s probabilities from his observed choice-
behavior (e.g., his observed response when presented with a proper scoring rule such as described
in Savage [1971]). Assume that the principal is risk neutral and her utility function is state
independent (that is, the principal’s utility function is the identity function) and that the agent
is risk averse and that his valuations of the payoﬀ, w, are depicted by state-dependent utility
functions uH (w)=βH√
w + αH,u M (w)=βM
√
w + αM, and uL (w)=βL
√
w + αL. Without
loss of generality let βH =1and αH =0 .
On the basis of the agent’s choice behavior, the principal ascribes to him subjective proba-
bilities, p = {pH,p M,p L} and a state-independent utility function, u(w), implied by the choice-
theoretic subjective expected utility model. In other words, as far as the principal is concerned,




w, pH = πH/(πH + πMβM + πLβL),p M = πMβM/(πH + πMβM + πLβL), and
pL = πLβL/(πH +πMβM +πLβL). Moreover, the principal ascribes to the agent the probability
5p({H,M})=pH + pL for the event {H,M}.
2.2 Principal-agent problems
Let the state-contingent revenue r =( rH,rM,rL) satisfy rH >r M >r L. A contract, w, is a
point in R3
+ representing the agent’s state contingent pay. We assume that contracts requiring
the agent to pay the principal in some states are not enforceable.1 Then, given his perception of
the agent’s subjective probabilities and utilities, the principal’s problem, as seen by the principal,
may be stated as follows:
Choose (a∗,w∗) ∈ B×R3
+ so as to maximize
X
s∈S
πP (s | F (a∗))(rs − w∗
s) (2)
subject to the participation constraint:
X
s∈S
pA (s | F (a∗))
p
w∗
s + v(a∗) ≥ v0, (3)
and the incentive compatibility constraints: for all a ∈ B
X
s∈S
pA(s | F (a∗))
p
w∗
s + v(a∗) ≥
X
s∈S
pA (s | F (a))
p
w∗
s + v(a), (4)
where the subscripts P denotes the conditional subjective probabilities of the principal and the
subscript A denotes the conditional subjective probabilities ascribed to the agent by the principal;
v0 is the outside option available to the agent in case he reject the contract; and v(a) represents
the disutility (cost) to the agent of taking the action a. Let v0 =0and, in view of the relative time
and eﬀort and ﬁnancial costs required to mount the two diﬀerent advertising campaigns, assume
that 0 >v(an) >v
¡
a`¢
. Note that pA (s | F (a)) = ps/p(F (a)) for all a ∈ B.
The agent’s problem may be stated as follows:











and implement the optimal action a∗ if U (a∗;w∗) ≥ v0. Otherwise reject the contract.
1 See section 3 below for a discussion of this assumption.
6It is obvious that the principal’s perception of the agent’s motives is diﬀerent from the agent’s
true motives. We turn next to examine some potential implications of misconstruing the agent’s
motives. Consistent with our depiction of the problem, we let rH = $200,r M =$ 1 0 0 , rL =
$30,v (an)=−1, and v
¡
a`¢
= −3. To illustrate the potential pitfalls of misconstrued assignment
of utilities and probabilities to the agent, we analyze two speciﬁc cases in which the agent is
envious of the principal.
2.3 Case I
Let the agent’s envy aﬀect the marginal utility of his income. More speciﬁcally, suppose that
increase in the principal’s income reduces the agent’s marginal utility of his income uniformly. To
capture this trait of the agent’s attitudes and at the same time preserve the preference structure,
we let αM = αL =0 , βM =1 .5, and βL =2 .5. The assumption βL > βM > βH is given the
interpretation that, for any given level of w, the agent’s utility and his marginal utility of income
are higher the lower is the principal’s income. This malevolent attitude cannot be detected by
observing the agent’s choice behavior.
Observe next that the principal would like to implement the action a`. To see this, note that








wM − 3 ≥ 0, (6)








wM − 3 ≥ pH√
wH + pM√
wM + pL√
wL − 1. (7)
Since the agent is risk averse, the least costly contract that satisﬁes the participation constraint
is to set wH = wM = w∗ and wL =0 . Substitute these in equations (6) and (7) together with the
implied values of the probabilities to obtain the participation constraint is
√
w∗ − 3 ≥ 0. (8)
and the incentive compatibility constraint:
√




w∗ − 1. (9)
7The incentive compatibility constraint is binding, and it implies that w∗ =1 6 . Substituting this
into the participation constraint, it is easy to verify that it is satisﬁed. Hence the optimal contract
is w∗ =( 1 6 ,16,0). The principal believes that, if he accepts the contract w∗, the agent’s best






100 − 16 = 134.





ws − 1 ≥ 0. (10)
Because the agent is risk averse the cheapest way to meet the constraint (10) is by setting ws =¯ w










30 − 1=1 0 9 .
Hence the principal’s perceived best interest is to implement a`. It is easy to verify that no other




Consider next the agent’s choices among the action-acts pair
¡
ai,w∗¢
,a i ∈ B. According to
the agent’s beliefs, the probabilities of the event F
¡
a`¢































Expression (11) implies that, given the contract w∗ which he accepts, the agent chooses the
action an contrary to the wishes of the principal. Because she misconstrued the agent’s subjective
probabilities and utilities, the principal designed a contract that induced the agent to choose an
action that is not in the principal’s best interest.
2.4 Case II
Envy may manifest itself by aﬀecting the level of the agent’s utility without, at the same time aﬀect
his marginal utilities. In this case the principal ascribes to the agent probabilities that accurately
reﬂects his beliefs. Yet, by misunderstanding the agent’s motives the principal still fails to induce
8him to choose the desirable action. To analyze this situation we let αH =0 ,αM =1 ,αL =2 ,a n d
βH = βM = βL =1 . In this case the agent’s envy is captured by values of the additive constants.
Speciﬁcally, αH < αM < αL is interpreted to mean that, for any given level of w, the agent’s
utility is higher the lower is the principal’s income.
As before, the principal’s problem is to design a contract w∗ that will implement a`. Because
the agent is risk averse and the principal is risk neutral, the optimal contract requires that wL =0
and wM = wH = w∗. Unlike the previous case, this time the probabilities that the principal
ascribes to the agent agrees with the agent’s own probabilities .
From the principal’s viewpoint the participation constraint is,
√
w∗ − 3 ≥ 0,
and the incentive compatibility constraint is,
√





The incentive compatibility constraint is binding and the solution is w∗ =3 6 . The principal’s
perceived expected utility under
¡
a`;w∗¢
is 114. If she tries to implement an then she design a
contract wH = wM = wL =¯ w that satisﬁes the participation constraint
√
¯ w −1 ≥ 0.T h u s¯ w =1
and the principal’s expected utility under (an;¯ w) is 109.




































Moreover, U (an;w∗) > 0 implies that the participation constraint is satisﬁed. Hence, the agent
chooses an, which again is an action that was not in the principal’s best interest.
3C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
The analysis in this paper illustrates and underscores the possible pitfalls of employing subjective
expected utility theory to the analysis of principal-agent problems. The source of diﬃculty is
9that the agent’s preferences may admit alternative equivalent representations involving distinct
subjective probabilities and state-dependent utility functions. If one’s only concern is with in-
dividual decisions and is willing to assume state-independent preferences, then nothing essential
is lost by imposing the convention that the utility functions are state-independent and deﬁning
subjective probabilities consistent with this convention. Decision makers’ beliefs, namely, a binary
relation on the set of events depicting the notion of “more likely to obtain,” are deﬁned by the
probabilities. In other words, if the only application of the theory is to individual decision making
then it is not necessary to separate utility and true probability, since only the product of the two
matters. Our analysis shows that this is no longer the case if the model is to be applied to the
richer context of the principle-agent theory, in which individuals face the need to infer the true
probabilities and utilities. We analyzed a simple example but the reader will recognize that the
issue pervades the entire principal-agent literature.
Our analysis imposes the restriction that contracts stipulating a payment by the agent to the
principal in some events are not enforceable. It is well known that if such payments could be
enforced it would be possible to penalize the agent to coerce him to avoid taking certain actions
that may be detected, ex post. In our example, if a large penalty could be imposed in case the
revenue rL is realized it would be possible to force the agent to avoid the action an f o rf e a ro f
being detected and penalized after the fact. In the literature on principal-agent problem this
issue is dealt with by assuming that all the conditional probability distributions have the same
support (see Salanié [1997]). To justify our approach we note that, as a matter of fact, it may be
impossible, in some situations, to enforce the required penalty. On the theoretical level we note
that the traditional analyses of the principal-agent problem (e.g., Holmstrom [1979], Shavell [1979])
suppress the explicit consideration of the states of nature and focus instead on the conditional
probabilities of the random variables representing the payoﬀ to the principal. This approach
conceals the fact that, if the principal and the agent are Bayesian subjective expected utility
maximizers then the probability distributions conditional on the agent’s actions must be derived
from some priors, in which case it is impossible that they all have exactly the same support. In
other words, if the agent is Bayesian, then the conditional probabilities representing his posterior
10beliefs are obtained from his prior probability by increasing, proportionally, the probability mass
on a subset of the original probability space. Hence, exluding trivial cases, the essential support
of the posterior is a proper subset of that of the prior.
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